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Abstract
The spread of the COVID-19 pandemic in the early months of 2020 strained liquidity in
short-term corporate funding markets around the world. In response, the Korean
government enacted a variety of direct and indirect measures to promote the smooth flow
of credit to households and businesses. Most of these measures focused on highly rated
companies. Recognizing the need to extend assistance to lower-rated issuers, the Bank of
Korea (BoK) invoked its authority under Article 80 of the Bank of Korea Act to establish
and fund the Corporate Liquidity Support Organization, Co., Ltd., a special-purpose vehicle
(SPV) authorized to purchase up to 10 trillion Korean won (KRW) (USD 8.3 billion) of
corporate bonds, commercial paper (CP), and short-term bonds that did not meet the
eligibility criteria for other support programs. The SPV began purchasing securities on July
14, 2020, accumulating a total of KRW 4.0 trillion worth of corporate bonds and CP by the
end of July 2021. Although the SPV was initially scheduled to purchase assets for six
months from the date of establishment, the BoK extended the timeframe twice to end on
December 31, 2021.
Keywords: asset purchases, commercial paper, corporate bonds, liquidity facility, shortterm funding, wholesale funding
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modules considering market support programs in response to COVID-19. Cases are available from the Journal
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Overview
The spread of COVID-19 in the early
months of 2020 threatened financial
stability both within and across nations.
While corporate funding conditions in
financial
markets
began
rapidly
deteriorating, aversion to credit risk
increased substantially. Central banks
around the world began to intervene in the
corporate bond and commercial paper (CP)
markets to ensure the supply of credit to
households and businesses. In South Korea,
the credit spread of AA-rated three-year
corporate bonds widened from 41.1 basis
points (bps) on February 1, 2020, to 77.1
bps on June 12, 2020 (NABO 2020a).
The Bank of Korea (BoK) and the Korean
government sought to support mid-sized
and large corporations whose liquidity
stresses might have spilled over to the real
economy and affected employment (NABO
2020a). Officials from the BoK, the
Financial Services Commission (FSC), and
the government enacted a series of
measures to address strains in domestic
liquidity, including the Bond Market
Stabilization Fund, primary collateralized
bond obligations purchases, and a quick
bond takeover program to assist with the
conversion issue of corporate bonds by the
Korea Development Bank (KDB).5
As a result of these market interventions,
issuance of blue-chip corporate bonds
rebounded in April 2020. Still, the market

Key Terms
Purpose: To support low-rated companies facing
financing difficulties in the credit securities market
by purchasing corporate bonds, commercial paper,
and short-term bonds, including junk-rated bonds
excluded from the Bond Market Stabilization Fund
and other government interventions.
Launch dates

Announced:
April 22, 20203
Authorized:
May 20, 2020

Operational Date

July 14, 20204

End Date

July 14, 2024

Legal Authority

Article 80 of the Bank of
Korea Act

Source of Funding

Bank of Korea
Korea Development
Bank

Administrators

Bank of Korea
Financial Services
Commission
Government of Korea

Overall Size

Initially KRW 10 trillion
with the potential to
increase to KRW 20
trillion

Purchased Assets

Corporate bonds rated
AA to BB; CP rated A1 to
A3; short-term bonds
with maturities up to
three years

Peak Utilization

KRW 4.5 trillion as of
end-December 2021

3 The

Korean government first mentioned the creation of the SPV in a press release dated April 22, 2020 (FSC
2020c).
4

The Korean Development Bank began purchasing corporate bonds on June 10, 2020, to support market
functioning while the National Assembly allocated budgetary resources for the SPV (MoEF 2020; Kim 2020).
5 Please

see Key Design Decision 1: Purpose/Part of a Package and Appendix A for further information on the
Korean government’s market liquidity interventions.
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for issuances by lower-rated companies—those with ratings of A or below—remained
weak, while the preference for short-term bonds continued to grow (FSC 2020d).
These two factors compelled the Bank of Korea to create the Corporate Liquidity Support
Organization, Co., Ltd., a special-purpose vehicle (SPV) designed to purchase lower-rated
corporate bonds and CP. Authorized under Article 80 of The Bank of Korea Act and
overseen by an Investment Management Committee appointed by the BoK, the SPV began
purchasing securities on July 14, 2020, using KRW 10 trillion (USD 8.3 billion)6 in funds
from the BoK and KDB. The facility was scheduled to operate for a total of four years from
the date of establishment (six months for purchases, three years for holding assets, and six
months for resolution), ending on July 14, 2024. Citing volatile market conditions, the BoK
extended the purchasing window twice, first to July 13, 2021, and ultimately to December
31, 2021 (BoK 2020e; BoK 2021a). By the end of July 2021, the SPV had purchased KRW
4.0 trillion worth of corporate bonds and CP (BoK 2021g).
Summary Evaluation
As is the case with most COVID-related market interventions, little has been written on the
impact of the SPV in isolation. The BoK credited the narrowing of corporate bond spreads
after July 2020 to its market stabilization measures, noting that by the end of 2020, spreads
had rapidly narrowed for both premium bonds (AAA through AA+, or A1) and nonpremium bonds (A through BBB, or A2/A3)7. The recovery in the bond market after
November 2020, the BoK reported, was due in part to the development and distribution of
vaccines to high-income countries, as well as to the support the SPV had provided to the
subprime bond market (BoK 2021b).
The National Assembly Budget Office (NABO) also singled out the SPV’s operations when
describing the impact of various measures, noting with concern that it was the only
program designed to support lower-rated corporate bonds and CP through passive
purchases. This approach could have made it difficult for companies to raise short-term
funds, leading to solvency concerns for those that were already rated poorly. The NABO
also pointed out that the SPV was completely government-funded, unlike other programs,
and that it should consider ways to support corporate bonds rated BBB or below.
Conversely, the NABO also cautioned that providing financial support to lower-rated
companies with “no possibility of business normalization after COVID-19” might also lead
to overwhelming pressures on the national budget (NABO 2020a).

6 Per Yahoo Finance, USD 1 = KRW 1,200 on March 2, 2020.
7 Based on Korean Financial Investment Association (KOFIA) ratings.
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Context: South Korea 2019–2020
GDP
$1.6 trillion in 2019
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD)
$1.6 trillion in 2020
GDP per capita
$31,937 in 2019
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD)
$31,631 in 2020
Data for 2019:
Moody’s: Aa2
S&P: AA
Fitch: AASovereign credit rating (five-year senior debt)

Size of banking system
Size of banking system as a percentage of GDP
Size of banking system as a percentage of
financial system
Five-bank concentration of banking system

Data for 2020:
Moody’s: Aa2
S&P: AA
Fitch: AA$2.6 trillion in 2019
$2.9 trillion in 2020
159.6% in 2019
174.3% in 2020
Data not available for 2019
Data not available for 2020

Data not available for 2019
Data not available for 2020
Data not available for 2019
Foreign involvement in banking system
Data not available for 2020
Data not available for 2019
Government ownership of banking system
Data not available for 2020
Yes, in 2019
Existence of deposit insurance
Yes, in 2020
Sources: Bloomberg; FRED; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World
Bank Deposit Insurance Dataset.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: Korean officials established the Corporate Liquidity Support
Organization, Co., Ltd. (the SPV) to support lower-rated bonds among a package
of measures that mostly focused on higher-rated bonds.
Despite the recovery in the market for higher-rated corporate bonds, the market for those
rated A or lower remained weak. This compelled the government to create a specialpurpose vehicle (SPV) to purchase lower-rated corporate bonds and commercial paper
(CP) (FSC 2020d). The asset purchase program complemented other market liquidity
interventions by assisting lower-rated issuers that were excluded from participation in the
bond market stabilization fund (BMSF) and other financial support programs. The BoK
further emphasized that its loans to the SPV were not meant to directly support “specific or
insolvent companies but to “ease credit risk aversion toward non-premium bonds and to
ensure stability in the credit and securities markets” (BoK 2020c).
2. Part of a Package: The Korean government established a variety of liquidity
support programs to stabilize financial markets at the outset of COVID-19.
In response to the rapid contraction of financial markets at the onset of COVID-19 in early
March 2020, the Korean government enacted a series of stabilization measures. These
interventions included a BMSF (KRW 20 trillion), a stock market stabilization fund (KRW
10.7 trillion), the Corporate Bond-Backed Lending Facility (CBBLF) (KRW 10 trillion), and
support for the issuance of primary collateralized bond obligations (KRW 6.7 trillion) and
corporate bonds (KRW 4.1 trillion).8 In addition, the government announced that it would
directly support market financing by providing KRW 5 trillion in liquidity for securities
companies, consisting of KRW 2.5 trillion for stock finance loans and KRW 2.5 trillion
through repo market financing by the BoK, as well as KRW 2 trillion in refinancing support
from the KDB9 and Korea Guarantee Fund (KODIT) for corporate commercial paper and
electronic short-term bonds.
The Financial Services Commission (FSC) reported in a May 20, 2020, press release that
these programs had together improved market conditions and that the total amount of
blue-chip corporate bonds had “rebounded” in April (FSC 2020d).
3. Legal Authority: The BoK invoked its authority under Article 80 (“Credit to ForProfit Enterprises”) of the Bank of Korea Act in establishing and funding the
program.
Article 79 (“Restrictions on transactions with the public”) of the Bank of Korea Act
normally forbids the central bank from making loans to, or purchasing the obligations of,
8 For more information, please see the Appendix.
9

Founded in 1954, the state-owned KDB is a policy bank that supports key public financing operations and
serves as a link between the government and the private sector.
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juridical persons or individuals other than banking institutions. However, Article 80
(“Credit to For-Profit Enterprises”) stipulates that, “when severe impediments arise to
obtaining funds from financial institutions or when there is a strong likelihood of their
arising,” the BoK may supply credit to any for-profit enterprise such as an SPV (BoK 2020j,
47; BoK 1950).
The Monetary Policy Committee offered two motives to support its decision. First, despite
gradual signs of improvement in the premium corporate bond and CP markets, it
determined that companies with low credit ratings needed further assistance to reactivate
the non-premium bond market. Second, the Committee did not expect that domestic banks
would be able to meet corporate funding demands given growing corporate credit risks
related to the pandemic (BoK 2020j).
4. Governance: The BoK was heavily involved in monitoring the activities and
progress of the SPV over the course of its operations.
In a press release dated July 17, 2020, the BoK’s Monetary Policy Committee outlined
circumstances under which it would conduct an investigation into the SPV’s activities.
Article 80 of the Bank of Korea Act, referencing paragraphs 3 and 4 of Article 65, stipulates
that the BoK may, “when it deems necessary, check and confirm the operations and status
of the assets of a banking institution in connection with its extension of credit,” and that the
BoK “shall hear the opinions of the Government before making decisions on emergency
credit” (BoK 1950, 20). Because the SPV held short-term debt on behalf of the central bank,
the BoK took active steps to evaluate asset and portfolio risk. It was particularly concerned
with the possibility of issuer default, stating that “in the event of delinquency of principal or
interest” or “commencement of rehabilitation procedures,” the BoK should be “notified
immediately” (BoK 2020c). The SPV would also have to comply with any BoK requests for
data or other information about its operations.
The BoK also worked to ensure that the SPV minimized losses. For example, if the SPV’s
asset holdings were reduced through repayment or sale, the SPV would repay the BoK
loans immediately, regardless of maturity date. In general, the BoK expected the SPV to
make “every effort” to repay the BoK loans as soon as possible (BoK 2020c). If, at any point,
losses were expected over the course of the SPV’s operation, the BoK would intervene to
decide whether to continue the program. However, although the SPV was expected to
minimize losses and discuss its operational direction with the BoK, the BoK would not
discontinue the program if losses were to occur above a certain amount (Kwon 2022).
Adhering to Article 80, paragraph 3, of the Bank of Korea Act, the BoK also reserved the
right to assess the risks associated with individual corporate bonds and CP.
Article 96 of the Bank of Korea Act also required the BoK to prepare assessment reports on
“progress in implementing monetary and credit policies and macro-financial stability
conditions” (BoK 1950). These were delivered on a semiannual basis to the National
Assembly, which could then summon the governor of the BoK for questioning.
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5. Administration: An initial operating committee composed of officials from the
government, BoK, and KDB was responsible for the design and establishment of
the SPV. Additionally, the BoK created a Board of Directors and Investment
Management Committee to advise the program.
The Board of the SPV was charged with making investment decisions. It was composed of
three directors and was charged with management-related matters, such as approving the
facility’s budget, overseeing changes to the articles of incorporation, and capital or
redemption issues (Kwon 2022).
The Investment Management Committee’s five members included the KDB vice chairman,
one private sector expert nominated by the KDB (with approval from other institutions),
and one nomination each by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Financial Services
Commission, and the BoK. As a complement to the Board’s oversight, the Investment
Management Committee oversaw the SPV’s daily operations. It was also responsible for
establishing investment guidelines and monitoring market conditions to decide whether to
increase the availability of the fund (up to KRW 20 trillion) or extend its purchasing
operations beyond the initial six months (FSC 2020d).
6. Communication: In its press releases, the BoK highlighted the importance of its
interventions as market stabilizers in a time of severe crisis.
The BoK initially emphasized that it established the SPV to assist lower-rated companies
that were having trouble accessing financing because of the lack of liquidity in short-term
funding markets. In subsequent press releases announcing changes to the program, the
central bank cited improved market conditions as the rationale for scaling back purchases
or rebalancing the proportion of eligible assets added to its portfolio (BoK 2020d; BoK
2020e; BoK 2021a).
In general, recognizing the need for transparency during a time of crisis, the BoK began to
make a concerted effort to improve upon the quality and frequency of its public
communications. It created a special menu subsection on its website entitled “Policy
Responses to COVID-19,” livestreamed press conferences on monetary policy decisions,
and released details on its extraordinary operations via press releases and quarterly
Monetary Policy Reports (BoK 2021b).
7. Disclosure: The BoK regularly reported on the SPV’s operations in its annual
reports, while the National Assembly Budget Office provided additional
information and analysis to the public.
The BoK adhered to Articles 101 and 102 of the Bank of Korea Act, requiring the
publication of balance sheets on a monthly basis, monetary policy reports, and annual
reports. These included information on BoK’s share of the total loan to the SPV, while
program usage was periodically published in public press releases. The National Assembly
Budget Office occasionally published reports on the BoK’s activities as well as press
releases informing the public about operational updates.
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8. Use of SPV: Because Article 79 of the Bank of Korea Act restricted the central
bank’s ability to purchase corporate bonds and CP directly, the Korean
government created an SPV as a subsidiary of the KDB.
In a press release dated May 20, 2020, the FSC announced that the KDB would begin
purchasing low-rated corporate bonds and CP prior to the creation of the SPV in order to
“expedite the provision of support . . . if deemed necessary” (FSC 2020d).
The KDB began pre-purchasing corporate bonds on June 10, 2020, to support market
functioning while the National Assembly allocated budgetary resources for the SPV (Kim
2020; MoEF 2020).
9. Size: The BoK initially set a maximum facility size of KRW 10 trillion, with the
possibility of increasing it to KRW 20 trillion.
In a joint press release on May 20, 2020, the FSC stated on behalf of the BoK and KDB that
future funding decisions would be made by the SPV’s initial operating committee,
comprising officials from the government, BoK, and KDB (FSC 2020d; Kwon 2022).
By the end of 2020, the volume of corporate bonds and CP purchased by the SPV had
reached 2.5 trillion won (BoK 2021b). As of the end of July 2021, the SPV had purchased
KRW 4.0 trillion worth of corporate bonds and CP (BoK 2021g).
Each corporation, or group of corporations,10 issuing debt to the SPV was subject to a
purchasing limit of 2% to 3% of the total amount of support (initially KRW 10 trillion) (FSC
2020d).
10. Source of Funding: The BoK committed to lending up to KRW 8 trillion, with the
KDB providing up to KRW 2 trillion in subordinated loans and equity capital.
In a press release dated May 20, 2020, the FSC stated that the SPV would be established
once the National Assembly passed the third supplementary budget containing a provision
for a KRW 500 billion investment in the KDB. The KDB would then provide the SPV with up
to KRW 1 trillion (10%) in subordinated loans and KRW 1 trillion (10%) in equity capital,
while the BoK committed to issuing up to KRW 8 trillion (80%) in senior loans.
The purpose of the government’s involvement (through the KDB) was to absorb risks,
while the BoK provided liquidity and the KDB established and managed the SPV (MoEF
2020). There were no loss-sharing agreements between the government and the BoK
(MoEF 2020).
Figure 1 illustrates the flow of funds from various government entities to corporations.

10

The Fair Trade Commission designates certain groups of companies as restricted groups for mutual
investment (BoK 2020c).
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Figure 1: SPV Financing Structure

Source: BoK 2020b, 2.

The BoK’s loans to the SPV earned an interest rate obtained by adding the average five-day
spread of one-year Monetary Stabilization Bonds (MSB)11 to the BoK base rate. The SPV
paid interest every three months. The loans had a maturity of one year and were
collateralized by all assets of the SPV. Upon receiving the loan, the SPV issued a bill to the
BoK in order to fund the purchases of corporate bonds and CP. The initial loan execution
deadline was set six months from the SPV’s date of establishment (July 14, 2020). The
creditors of the SPV expected repayment in one lump sum at the time of maturity, although
early repayment was also allowed (BoK 2020c).
The SPV started with KRW 3 trillion in its first round of funding on July 23, 2020. That total
included KRW 1 trillion in equity capital from KDB, an initial senior loan of KRW 1.78
trillion from the BoK, and an initial subordinated loan of KRW 0.22 trillion from KDB
(MoEF 2020). The BoK planned to disburse the rest of its committed loans through four
separate capital calls (BoK 2021b).
Of the initial KRW 3 trillion, KRW 2.5 trillion (82.4%) had been exhausted by December 24,
2020. The SPV raised KRW 2 trillion in a second capital call on January 12, 2021, including
another KRW 1.78 trillion in senior loans from the BoK and KRW 0.22 trillion in

11

This is calculated based on the average of four private bond rating agencies (KIS Bond Rating, Korea Asset
Rating, NISPI, and F&I) (BoK 2020c).
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subordinated loans from KDB. By the end of January 2021, the SPV had purchased KRW 2.5
trillion worth of corporate bonds and CP (BoK 2021c).
After the second capital call, the BoK determined that conditions in the corporate bond and
CP markets had stabilized. It announced it would no longer make new loans to the SPV and
would keep the loan execution deadline set to July 13, 2021. The SPV could have re-loaned
funds that borrowers had already repaid from the initial round of loans, but ultimately it
did not do so (BoK 2021a).
11. Eligible Institutions: The SPV targeted lower-rated companies that were not
eligible for participation in other BoK programs.
Because domestic financial institutions had access to other sources of funding and operated
according to their own risk management frameworks, the BoK excluded them from
eligibility (BoK 2020j). Companies that had had an interest coverage ratio of 100% or less
for two consecutive years (pre-COVID-19) were also barred from participation (BoK
2020c).
International companies were not eligible for participation in the program (Kwon 2022).
12. Auction or Standing Facility: The SPV was designed as a standing facility to which
participants could issue eligible assets at any time during operation.
The SPV carried out purchasing operations as funding from capital calls became available.
13. Loan or Purchase: The BoK and KDB funded an SPV with loans that were then
used to purchase eligible assets on behalf of the BoK.
The program allowed lower-rated companies to issue corporate bonds, CP, and short-term
bonds to the publicly funded facility.
14. Eligible Assets: The SPV mainly purchased corporate bonds and CP issued by
non-financial institutions, while also purchasing short-term bonds.
The SPV accepted short-term bonds with maturities of up to three years.12 The BoK
required issuers to be investment grade (rated at least BBB) before April 22, 2020, focusing
mostly on A-rated bonds. However, it also committed to lend to “fallen angels,” that is,
issuers whose credit ratings were downgraded to junk status (BB) after April 22, 2020,
because of the COVID-19 crisis. Ratings were based on those provided by domestic Korean
rating agencies (Kwon 2022). The SPV also accepted CP issued by corporations rated A1 to
A3.

12

Short-term bonds, as defined by the Capital Markets Act, were essentially the same as CP but were issued
and distributed electronically according to standardized procedure to increase market transparency and
investor protection. They were formerly referred to as “electronic short-term bonds” (Kwon 2022).
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The BoK instituted portfolio allocation targets by credit rating. It announced in a July 17,
2020, press release that the proportion of holdings “should not deviate significantly” from
the following: “30% or more of AA grade (including A1 grade), 55% of grade A (including
A2 grade), and 15% or less of BBB grade or lower (including A3 grade)” (BoK 2020c). The
central bank sought to balance the SPV’s holdings by selling debt in accordance with these
guidelines after six months of the facility’s establishment.
Citing both improved conditions in the corporate bond market and the need to better
support CP issuance, the BoK announced on December 24, 2020, that it would rebalance its
allocations. It reduced the proportion of premium bond (AA) purchases from 30% to 25%
while expanding the share of non-premium bonds (A to junk) from 70% to 75% (BoK
2020e).
The BoK ultimately never ended up purchasing short-term bonds (Kwon 2022).
15. Purchase Price: The BoK imposed purchase prices at discount rates that were
slightly higher than market rates in order to encourage businesses to seek
funding on the capital markets.
The BoK privately determined purchase prices by adding penalty spreads to market rates
depending on the credit ratings of the assets (Kwon 2022). According to the FSC, this
pricing scheme was intended to “encourage” business to raise funding on the capital
markets (FSC 2020d).
16. Haircuts: This Key Design Decision does not apply to asset purchase programs.
Haircuts apply only to programs that involve lending to counterparties.
17. Interest Rates: This Key Design Decision does not apply to asset purchase
programs.
Interest rates apply only to programs that involve lending to counterparties.
18. Fees: The BoK did not charge eligible issuers any fees for accessing the SPV.
Sources consulted did not describe any administrative or participation fees.
19. Term/Repayment: This Key Design Decision does not apply to asset purchase
programs.
This refers to the loan maturity and applies only to programs that involve lending to
counterparties.
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20. Other Restrictions on Eligible Participants: The government encouraged
minimum employment thresholds for middle-market enterprises and large
corporations issuing debt to the SPV.
In its initial press release announcing the establishment of the SPV on April 22, 2020, the
FSC stated that the government would promote “a certain level of employment for a
specific period of time” if the number of entities issuing to the SPV exceeded a particular
threshold (FSC 2020c). Subsequent press releases and other sources consulted did not
specify whether this was a formal stipulation that had ever been imposed during the SPV’s
operations.
21. Regulatory Relief: Eligible issuers did not receive regulatory relief for
participating in the program.
Participation in the program did not entitle eligible issuers to regulatory relief.
22. International Coordination: The BoK did not coordinate with any international
jurisdictions to establish or operate the SPV.
The SPV was a domestic program that did not necessitate international coordination.
23. Duration: Although the SPV was initially designed to conduct purchases for six
months, its operations were extended twice to terminate on December 31, 2021.
The facility was originally scheduled to operate for a total of four years from its date of
establishment: six months for purchases, three years for holding assets, and six months for
resolution.
The initial press release dated April 22, 2020, announced that the SPV would conduct
purchases for six months from the date of establishment on July 14, 2020, “with the
possibility of extension based on market conditions” (FSC 2020d).
On December 24, 2020, the BoK, the government, and the KDB jointly decided to lengthen
the purchasing timeframe by six months, to July 13, 2021, while also expanding the share of
non-premium bond purchases. In announcing the extension, which also prolonged the
holding and resolution timeline, the BoK cited its intention to continue supporting lowrated companies “facing difficulties from the prolonged COVID-19 pandemic” (BoK 2021c,
vi).
On June 30, 2021, the BoK announced that it had again extended SPV purchasing
operations, this time until December 31, 2021. However, the central bank did not extend
the duration of a new loan provision to the SPV beyond July 13, 2021, citing improved
market conditions and the belief that the SPV would be sufficiently funded through the end
of the year (BoK 2021a).
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Appendix
Bond Market Stabilization Fund (BMSF)
On March 24, 2020, the FSC announced plans to revive the BMSF to supplement market
demand for corporate bonds and CP issued by blue-chip companies (BoK and FSC 2020, 7).
The facility, which had initially been designed during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC),
began purchasing assets on April 1, 2020 (BoK and FSC 2020, 7). Unlike the wholly
government-backed SPV for lower-rated companies, the BMSF sourced its funding through
the KDB and capital calls from 84 financial institutions (i.e., banks, securities companies,
and insurance corporations) (Jung, Lee, and Song 2020, 890). The government initially
allocated KRW 10 trillion to the Fund, with the possibility of expanding the capital base to
KRW 20 trillion if market conditions warranted (FSC 2020a). Eligible assets were limited to
prime (at least AA) corporate bonds or prime CP (at least A1), but some exceptions were
made for subprime corporate bonds rated up to A+ issued by credit-specialized financial
companies and “fallen angels” affected by the COVID-19 crisis (BoK 2020j, 49). The BMSF
did not purchase non-investment-grade assets (BoK 2020j, 49). Because of the BMSF’s
limited purchasing scope, market participants did not consider the program to have been
very impactful, providing only KRW 1.95 trillion in its first two months of operation (Yoon
2020; NABO 2020a, 150).
Stock Market Stabilization Fund (SMSF)
The FSC announced in the same March 24, 2020, press release plans for the establishment
of a KRW 10.7 trillion Stock Market (or “Securities Market”) Stabilization Fund (SMSF),
backed voluntarily by five major financial holding companies, 18 “leading” financial
companies in each industry, and four securities institutions (such as the Korea Exchange)
(FSC 2020a; BoK and FSC 2020, 10; Jung, Lee, and Song 2020, 891). Contributions to the
SMSF, raised through capital calls beginning in April 2020, were then invested in the KOPSI
200 index (FSC 2020a). Participating corporations received regulatory relief in order to
reduce the risk of investment loss (BoK and FSC 2020, 10).
Corporate Bond-Backed Lending Facility (CBBLF)
Invoking its authority under Articles 64 (“Credit Operations with Banking institutions”)
and 80 (“Credit to For-Profit Enterprises”) of the Bank of Korea Act, the BoK announced on
April 16, 2020, that it would begin making loans to financial institutions through an SPV
(BoK 2020a). The BoK stated in its initial press release that the measure was “expected to
contribute to stabilizing the corporate bond market,” and “[alleviate] market anxiety by
setting up a standing lending facility” (BoK 2020a). Although the BoK initially allocated
KRW 10 trillion to the CBBLF and set operations to expire three months from the date of
establishment, it reserved the right to increase the amount of lending or extend the
timeframe based on market conditions (BoK 2020a). Eligible institutions included 16 banks
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and 23 branches of foreign banks, securities companies,13 and six insurance companies that
had previously signed agreements for current account transactions with the BoK and that
had equity capital of at least KRW 3 trillion (BoK 2020a). The facility provided loans with
terms of up to six months to eligible institutions in exchange for high-quality corporate
bonds (rated at least AA-) with at least five years of maturity remaining (BoK 2020a).
Borrowers could receive up to 25% of their equity capital in loans from the CBBLF, paying
a constant interest rate equal to 85 bps over the yield on Korean Monetary Stabilization
Bonds (182 days) (BoK 2020a). Given the persistent volatility in financial markets
throughout 2020, the BoK decided to extend the CBBLF’s operations twice (BoK 2020j, 39).
It ultimately ended the program on February 3, 2021, citing stabilized financial markets,
improved liquidity conditions for financial institutions, and the existence of the SPV for
lower-rated corporate bond and CP purchases (BoK 2020f, vi).
Outright Purchases of Treasury Bonds
The BoK decided to carry out direct purchases of Treasury bonds to stabilize the market
and preemptively address the potential imbalance in supply and demand as regular
sources of short-term corporate funding dried up (BoK 2020d). Purchases were conducted
around the end of the month by competitive bid with multiple interest rates; the size of the
purchase was announced one business day ahead of the auction (BoK 2020d). The total
amount of outright purchases conducted by the BoK over the course of 2020 reached KRW
11 million, with the final purchase conducted on November 27, 2020 (BoK 2021c, vi).
While the central bank began in March 2020 by purchasing mostly benchmark bonds, its
focus shifted to non-benchmark bonds with low transaction volume in April as market
conditions stabilized (BoK 2020j, 39). During the summer of 2020, the BoK focused
particularly on enhancing primary dealers’ ability to underwrite Treasury bonds (BoK
2020j, 39).

13

This group included the Korea Securities Finance Corp. and 15 securities companies that were either
primary dealers or counterparties eligible for outright transactions or RP transactions (BoK 2020a).
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